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Effect of segregation on inequality in kinetic models of wealth exchange
L. Fernandes∗ and J. Tempere
Theory of Quantum and Complex Systems, Universiteit Antwerpen, B-2000 Antwerpen, Belgium
Empirical distributions of wealth and income can be reproduced using simplified agent-based
models of economic interactions, analogous to microscopic collisions of gas particles. Building upon
these models of freely interacting agents, we explore the effect of a segregated economic network
in which interactions are restricted to those between agents of similar wealth. Agents on a 2D
lattice undergo kinetic exchanges with their nearest neighbours, while continuously switching places
to minimize local wealth differences. A spatial concentration of wealth leads to a steady state
with increased global inequality and a magnified distinction between local and global measures of
combatting poverty. Individual saving propensity proves ineffective in the segregated economy, while
redistributive taxation transcends the spatial inhomogeneity and greatly reduces inequality. Adding
fluctuations to the segregation dynamics, we observe a sharp phase transition to lower inequality at
a critical temperature, accompanied by a sudden change in the distribution of the wealthy elite.
I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of wealth and income is a relevant
topic in any society, as economic inequality often lies at
the heart of societal problems [1–4]. Vilfredo Pareto was
the first to note that income is not distributed symmet-
rically around a mean value, but rather follows a power
law with many people at the bottom and a small wealthy
elite at the top [5]. Data from a variety of countries and
periods has suggested a relative insensitivity of this power
law tail to economic and political details [6–8]. Contem-
porary surveys and tax reports have led to a consensus
that both wealth and income generally follow an expo-
nential or lognormal probability distribution in the lower
and middle classes, crossing over to a power law in the
top percentiles [6, 9–11]:
P (m) ∼
{
mγ exp(−m/θ) m < mc,
m−(1+ν) m ≥ mc.
(1)
We illustrate this in Fig. 1 with new data for our home
country, Belgium. From a fit to the data, we find θ =
25, 407± 12 EUR and ν = 2.496± 0.014. The crossover
value mc = 97 kEUR suggests the top 2-3% of incomes
follow a power law, while the Gini index of inequality
G ≈ 0.48 [42] is in agreement with the analytical value
G = 1/2 of the exponential distribution [12].
The robust statistical properties of economic distribu-
tions and the similarity between the exponential regime
and the Boltzmann distribution of energy in physical sys-
tems have led to attempts to explain these distributions
with methods from statistical physics. A particularly
successful path has been the development of agent-based
models (ABM’s), in which statistical properties are ob-
tained through a large number of microscopic transac-
tions in a population of economic agents, analogous to
random collisions of particles in thermodynamic systems.
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FIG. 1: (Colour online) Cumulative distribution Q(m) =
P (M > m) of net individual annual income m in Belgium,
based on tax returns of income year 2016. The data is fitted
to an exponential distribution for the lowest 99% of incomes,
and to a power law for the top percentile. These regimes
are illustrated by the straight lines in the log-linear inset and
logarithmic main figure, respectively. The crossover point was
approximated as the intersection of the fitted curves. Data
source: [13].
Besides the statistical distribution of wealth among a
population discussed above, also its distribution through-
out socio-economic networks is an important issue in so-
ciological research on inequality. As social relations oc-
cur more frequently between people of similar economic
status, the formation of communities of concentrated
poverty and wealth can lead to a segregation of economic
classes, endangering social cohesion and perpetuating ex-
isting inequalities through impaired economic mobility
[4, 14, 15]. Similar to the topics studied in statistical
physics, this social segregation arises as a macroscopic
consequence of many individuals acting on rational or ir-
rational considerations. Such self-organizing segregation
along a categorical parameter such as ethnicity or religion
2was first modeled by Schelling [16]. In his model, agents
on a two-dimensional lattice belong to one of two groups,
and move to a different position whenever the fraction of
unlike neighbours in their local neighbourhood is higher
than a critical tolerance. Surprisingly, spontaneous seg-
regation was shown to occur even for high values of indi-
vidual tolerance. The Schelling model has been studied
extensively by sociologists and economists [17], and has
more recently received attention from physicists due to
its rich phase diagram and similarity to physical phe-
nomena [18–21]. Stauffer and Solomon [19] noted the
link between the Schelling model and the Ising model
for ferromagnetism, and introduced thermal fluctuations
in the microscopic dynamics. Socially, such fluctuations
can be interpreted as the effect of external forces causing
agents to move into a site which lowers their happiness.
Here, we combine the statistical models of wealth ex-
change and distribution on the one hand, with a dynami-
cal model of wealth-based segregation on the other hand.
In contrast to agent-based wealth exchange models stud-
ied elsewhere [22, 23], the agents in our model interact
only within their local environment, which changes con-
tinuously due to the segregation dynamics. This allows
us to investigate the feedback effect of segregation, driven
by wealth inequality, on the wealth inequality itself.
In Sec. II we discuss several gas-like exchange models,
containing various refinements in the modelling of eco-
nomic behaviour. A mechanism for generating wealth-
based segregation in a network of interacting economic
agents is introduced in Sec. III. In Sec. IV we present
and discuss our results, obtained using different exchange
models in conjunction with these segregation dynamics.
We summarize and interpret the implications of our find-
ings in Sec. V.
II. KINETIC MODELS OF WEALTH
EXCHANGE
We consider a population of N agents, each having
an initial wealth m
(t=0)
i = 1. At every time step, two
randomly chosen agents exchange a certain amount ∆m.
Their change in wealth is given by:
{
m
(t+1)
i = m
(t)
i +∆m,
m
(t+1)
j = m
(t)
j −∆m.
(2)
By refining the rules governing ∆m, different aspects of
economic behaviour can be incorporated; extensive re-
views of these exchange models can be found in [22, 23].
With the aim of adding segregation to existing mod-
els, we limit ourselves to local interactions of additive
exchange and focus on two relevant extensions: saving
propensity and redistributive taxation. In the simplest
additive model, the exchange is achieved by randomly re-
distributing the combined wealth of the involved agents:

m
(t+1)
i = ǫ
(
m
(t)
i +m
(t)
j
)
,
m
(t+1)
j = (1− ǫ)
(
m
(t)
i +m
(t)
j
)
.
(3)
This rule intuitively corresponds to elastic collisions of
gas particles. In a population where all agents can inter-
act with each other, it leads to a steady state described by
a Boltzmann law regardless of initial conditions [22, 23].
Multiplicative exchange processes, typically found in
income from capital, have also been studied in the past.
These were shown to lead to power law distributions with
greater inequality and even a condensation of all wealth
with one agent, implying a collapse of the economy [24,
25].
A. Saving propensity
Realistically, people rarely spend all their money in a
single exchange. We therefore introduce a saving factor
S0, representing the fraction of wealth that agents do not
enter into an interaction [26]. The exchange rule then
becomes

m
(t+1)
i = S0m
(t)
i + ǫ(1− S0)
(
m
(t)
i +m
(t)
j
)
,
m
(t+1)
j = S0m
(t)
j + (1− ǫ)(1− S0)
(
m
(t)
i +m
(t)
j
)
.
(4)
This individual saving behaviour prevents agents from
ending up in complete poverty (mi = 0), altering the
exponential law into a distribution peaked at finite m,
which has been argued to be a gamma distribution [27].
In the case of multiplicative exchange, such saving be-
haviour does not always prevent wealth condensation
[25]. To reflect the fact that not everyone in society man-
ages their money in the same way, we also study the case
where some people spend a lot, while others save every-
thing they acquire. This is achieved by assigning an indi-
vidual saving factor Si to each agent, sampled uniformly
from the interval [0, 1]. Just like multiplicative exchange,
this model of distributed savings leads to a power law dis-
tribution for the wealthiest percentiles of the population
[28, 29], strongly resembling empirical distributions such
as that in Figure 1.
B. Redistributive taxation
Lastly, we include government intervention in the form
of taxes. Taxation schemes vary in the object of the tax,
the agents required to contribute and the way in which
the tax is levied [3]. Some taxation schemes have been
studied in agent-based models [30–33]. In the present
work, we consider only simplified redistributive taxation,
distinguishing between taxes on income and on wealth.
In the former case, a tax is levied on each transaction
by taking a fraction of the exchanged quantity ∆m and
3redistributing it uniformly among all agents in the popu-
lation [30, 31]. Similar to the effect of a constant saving
factor, this taxation scheme suppresses the m = 0 popu-
lation, the fundamental difference being that poverty is
now prevented by global intervention rather than by a
change in individual behaviour. In the latter scenario,
taxes are levied in proportion to an agent’s total wealth
at any given time. Following each exchange, we levy a
certain fraction of wealth of both agents involved, and
redistribute this wealth uniformly across the lattice.
III. WEALTH-BASED SEGREGATION
A. Motivation
The difficulty in reducing complex social dynamics to
tractable systems has led to many specific models of vary-
ing complexity, each with their own assumptions and pa-
rameters. In this section we propose a new and relatively
simple model of wealth-based segregation in an evolving
economy, which displays rich dynamics while at the same
time overcoming several limitations of existing models.
Firstly, none of the models found in the literature con-
sider exchanges of wealth in conjunction with segrega-
tion dynamics, instead keeping the agents’ wealth fixed
throughout the simulation [34, 35]. However, the inclu-
sion of economic transactions is crucial to study the effect
of segregation on global inequality. A second challenge
arises in the incorporation of a continuous wealth vari-
able. In the past, a common approach to both measuring
and modelling economic segregation has been the divi-
sion of a population into discrete classes, allowing the
use of categorical measures [35–37]. While parameter-
free methods have been developed to define classes in em-
pirical data [37], any categorization in a computational
model will inevitably introduce a presumptive and pos-
sibly artificial class structure. In a recent alternative ap-
proach, the Schelling model was extended to continuous
wealth by treating any richer neighbours as others [34].
With the aim of modelling dynamics driven by the af-
fordability of residences, agents in this model are drawn
towards poorer neighbours. For our purpose of achiev-
ing a homophily towards agents of comparable wealth
status, this model neglects the unhappiness caused by
poorer neighbours, and disregards that a greater wealth
difference should lead to greater unhappiness.
To overcome these limitations, we combine both wealth
exchange and segregation dynamics, driven by local dif-
ferences in wealth, regardless whether neighbours are
richer or poorer. In retaining the continuous character
of wealth throughout our treatment, we avoid any arti-
facts that may arise from classification. The price to pay
is that we cannot strictly speak of segregation between
any distinct classes. What we mean by segregation in
the remainder of this paper is therefore no more than
a macroscopic gradient of wealth, as a consequence of
microscopic homophily. Nevertheless, interpreting segre-
gation as any pattern that deviates significantly from a
random distribution [37], we may still lay claim to the
terminology.
B. Model definition
Following the tradition of magnetic systems, we define
a Hamiltonian,
H =
∑
<ij>
(
mi −mj
〈m〉
)2
, (5)
which runs over all nearest-neighbour links in the two-
dimensional lattice. The energy of the system is mini-
mized when all local differences in wealth vanish. Con-
trary to the Schelling model, segregation is explicitly
favored in the microscopic interactions. This Hamilto-
nian is furthermore equivalent to the field Hamiltonian
H [φ] =
∫
∇φ(x)2dx in continuous space, whose equation
of motion is the steady state diffusion equation.
A simulation starts with an N × N lattice filled with
agents of wealth m
(t=0)
i = 1. Unlike the Schelling model,
agents do not move into vacant sites, the number of which
would introduce an additional parameter [21]. Instead,
we propose at each time step a transition from state α to
β, attained by switching two random agents in the lattice
[43]. The transition is accepted with a probability given
by the Metropolis-Hastings rule,
P(α→ β) = min
[
1, exp
{
−∆E
T
}]
, (6)
where ∆E = Eβ − Eα. These transitions are equivalent
to Kawasaki kinetics for magnetic systems, which sam-
ple the equilibrium distribution at temperature T while
conserving the total magnetization [38]. When T > 0,
transitions increasing the energy of the system are real-
ized with finite probability. As in earlier work [19, 34],
these fluctuations are interpreted here as external forces,
causing agents to perform a move which violates their
homophilic preference. This includes coincidences like
personal quarrels or natural disasters, but also the conse-
quences of policy promoting the interaction between eco-
nomic classes. Examples of this are improved access to
education, efforts to activate the unemployed, or housing
subsidies to achieve residential mixing [1, 19]. Note that
a move lowering the energy evaluated by the Hamilto-
nian in Eq. (5) lowers tensions in the whole society, thus
increasing the common good. As such, Eq. (5) cannot be
interpreted as an individual cost or utility function in the
economic sense. This is in contrast to the egoistic moves
of the Schelling model, which increase the happiness of
one agent but may lead to an overall decrease in happi-
ness. Figure 2 shows the effect of these microscopic moves
in a lattice of agents that move but do not exchange. In
the long-time limit, any initially mixed society evolves to
a state of segregation, exhibiting a macroscopic wealth
gradient throughout the lattice.
4FIG. 2: Initial lattice (left) and typical steady state (right)
reached by agent movements determined by Eq. (6) at T = 0.
For visual clarity, agents’ individual wealth is fixed in this
illustration; they move but do not exchange.
To complete the model, we include kinetic exchanges.
After moving, one of the two involved agents undergoes
an exchange with one of its four nearest neighbours, ac-
cording to the rules outlined in Sec. II. This fully coupled
approach of segregation dynamics and kinetic exchanges
is, at the present time, a new addition to the field.
IV. RESULTS
The solid line in Fig. 3 shows the steady state dis-
tribution of the additive exchange model discussed in
Sec. II, excluding saving propensity or taxation and com-
bined with fully deterministic segregation dynamics (i.e.
T = 0). For comparison, the dashed line shows the dis-
tribution at T → ∞; this limit corresponds to a model
without any restriction on interaction partners and fol-
lows a Boltzmann law as expected [23]. The global pref-
erence of surrounding oneself with neighbours of similar
wealth status leads to a macroscopically segregated soci-
ety and results in a distribution of wealth with a heavier
tail (which is however no power law). Due to the spatial
separation of poor and wealthy agents, the Gini index of
inequality has increased from 0.5 to approximately 0.98
in the 400 × 400 lattice. Whereas poor agents in the
unsegregated model could at any time interact with a
rich agent and gain wealth quickly, they are now isolated
from the vast portion of wealth in the economy. As such,
the segregation mechanism impedes economic mobility
by restricting access of poor agents to wealthy interac-
tion partners.
A. Saving propensity
Figure 4 shows the Gini index of inequality for dif-
ferent values of the saving factor S0 in the model with
uniform savings (Sec. II A). A linear decrease to per-
fect equality can be noted in the absence of segregation,
consistent with results reported in [26]. On a 2D lattice
at T = 0, this behaviour only remains for small soci-
eties. When the lattice size and hence the spatial con-
FIG. 3: Steady state distribution of the model outlined in
Sec. III, using kinetic exchanges without saving propensity
or taxation. The main figure is the result of 10 independent
simulations in a 400×400 lattice. The steady state at T →∞
was obtained by performing t = 10, 000 sweeps of N2 micro-
scopic moves, such that the distribution at time t no longer
deviates significantly from the one reached at time t/2. The
T = 0 result was obtained through a process of annealing de-
tailed in Fig. 7. The inset shows the dependence of inequality
on the lattice size N .
centration of wealth is increased, individual saving be-
haviour becomes a less effective strategy for combatting
inequality. In a 200× 200 lattice, retaining 90% of one’s
wealth in each transaction only results in a decrease of
inequality from G = 0.96 to G = 0.88. Thus, in the pres-
ence of wealth-based segregation, saving behaviour alone
doesn’t suffice to produce levels of inequality consistent
with empirical distributions such as Fig. 1. Additionally,
we find convergence towards the steady state is slowed
down significantly in a large lattice and in the limit of
high saving propensity. The steady state distribution
of the model with distributed savings and segregation
is shown in Fig. 5, in comparison to the model with-
out savings. The top percentiles obey a power law with
exponent ν = 1.058 ± 0.037, consistent with the value
ν = 1 reported in [28] for the same exchange model with-
out segregation, but not in agreement with the empirical
distribution in Fig. 1. Patriarca et al. [29] explained this
power law behaviour by the occurrence of hoarders with a
high saving factor who accumulate wealth. In particular,
they found a relation between agents’ wealth and saving
factor of the form 〈m(S)〉 ∼ (1− 〈S〉)
−1
. We find a simi-
lar positive correlation, which is however exponential for
the majority of poor agents, and follows the above form
only in the top percentiles.
B. Redistributive taxation
The addition of a redistributive tax (Sec. II B) has
a stronger effect on inequality. Both for income and
wealth taxes, Fig. 6 shows a sharp initial decrease of
5FIG. 4: Gini index of inequality in the model with uniform
saving factor S0 and segregation dynamics at T = 0. Data
points (o, , △, ⋄, +) represent the distribution reached af-
ter 100,000 sweeps in lattices of the given size. The corre-
sponding distributions after 10,000 sweeps (x) indicate the
slow convergence in the limit of high saving propensity. Error
bars representing the standard deviation of 10 independent
simulations are smaller than the markers and were omitted.
FIG. 5: Steady state distribution of the model with dis-
tributed savings and segregation dynamics at T = 0. The
figure is the result of 10 independent simulations in a 400×400
lattice. The dashed black line is identical to the solid blue line
in Fig. 3. The dotted line is a power law of exponent ν = 1.
inequality with increasing tax rate. Whereas inequality
in absence of taxation is highly dependent on the spa-
tial concentration of wealth and thus on the lattice size,
this dependence disappears asymptotically in the limit of
high taxation: global redistribution transcends the spa-
tial segregation. Inequality decreases monotonically with
increasing income tax, shown in Fig. 6(a), converging to
a finite value G ≈ 0.34 when 100% of each exchange is
redistributed. While no one in this extreme scenario can
gain wealth except through redistribution, each interac-
tion still implies a random loss for one of the involved
agents, preventing a state of perfect equality. We find
that an income tax of 24% reproduces the inequality of
the empirical distribution in Fig. 1. This is in contrast
to an unsegregated economy, where G = 0.5 is reached
by additive exchanges without redistribution. Also in the
case of wealth taxation, Fig. 6(b), inequality remains fi-
nite when all wealth is redistributed, since this scenario
is equivalent to randomly reducing one agent’s wealth to
zero at each time step. Interestingly, this limit yields ex-
actly the natural value G ≈ 0.5 for the case of additive
exchanges in an unsegregated economy. Contrary to in-
come taxation, inequality is now minimized for a finite
wealth tax rate of approximately 40%. The necessity of
taxation to achieve levels of inequality found in empir-
ical distributions, which are likewise shaped by income
taxes, provides an indication for the role of wealth-based
segregation in economic inequality.
FIG. 6: Gini index of inequality in the model with redistribu-
tive income (a) and wealth (b) taxation, including segregation
dynamics at T = 0. Data points represent the steady state
distribution reached after 2000 sweeps in lattices of the given
size. Error bars representing the standard deviation of 10 in-
dependent simulations are smaller than the markers and were
omitted.
C. Thermal fluctuations
So far we have concentrated on fully deterministic seg-
regation, that is, the T = 0 limit of the transition rule
given by Eq. (6). This means an agent will never move
to a location perceived as disadvantageous. We now turn
our attention to thermal fluctuations in these homophilic
6moves. As seen from Eq. (6), the effect of a non-zero tem-
perature is to allow for such disadvantageous transitions.
Figure 7 shows the Gini index as a function of T for the
simplest model without saving or taxation. The over-
all decrease of inequality with rising temperature is to
be expected, since noise is added to a mechanism which
increases inequality. At a critical temperature TC we
observe a sudden decrease in inequality, which becomes
sharper and with bigger fluctuations as the thermody-
namic limit is approached, resembling a second order
phase transition. The exponential shape and resulting
Gini index of the empirical distribution shown in Fig. 1
indicate that, in the presented framework, the Belgian
economy corresponds to the unsegregated phase.
FIG. 7: Gini index of inequality in the model without saving
or taxation, and segregation dynamics at finite temperature.
Data points represent the steady state distributions reached
during a process of annealing from high to low T , in which the
system relaxes to its steady state after 1000 sweeps at a given
temperature, before being cooled down by ∆T = 0.25. Error
bars represent the standard deviation after 10 independent
simulations. The arrow indicates the direction in which the
phase boundary is crossed.
More insight into the nature of this transition is ob-
tained from the distribution of wealth around the critical
temperature. Figure 8 shows the cumulative distribu-
tion function for T ≪ TC , T < TC , T = TC and T > TC .
From Figure 8(a) we conclude that at T ≪ TC , the distri-
bution can roughly be divided into two regimes. Among
poor agents, differences in wealth are relatively small. As
such, the quantity ∆E is small for moves involving poor
agents. A low but finite temperature in this case suffices
to let the exponential in Eq. (6) approach unity. For
moves involving rich agents, ∆E can take on larger values
and hence a higher temperature is required for thermal
fluctuations to have a significant effect on the resulting
distribution. This explains why the poor majority deseg-
regates at low temperature and follows the distribution
for T → ∞, while the top percentiles still follow the
T = 0 distribution. As can be seen from Figure 8(b)-
(d) the phase transition to lower inequality is related to
a sudden desegregation among the wealthy elite. The
resulting mixing of classes increases interactions among
them, which is seen to reduce inequality in the global
distribution of wealth.
FIG. 8: Steady state distribution of the model with segre-
gation dynamics at finite temperature. For comparison we
also show the distributions at T = 0 and T → ∞, equiva-
lent to those in Fig. 3. Each distribution corresponds to an
equilibrium point of the 400× 400 curve in Fig. 7.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have shown that when economic agents, exchang-
ing wealth through kinetic collisions on a lattice, con-
tinuously switch places in an attempt to minimize lo-
cal differences in wealth, inequality is increased dramati-
cally due to the macroscopic separation of rich and poor
agents. Inequality in itself isn’t necessarily perceived as
problematic, so long as there is economic mobility allow-
ing for rags-to-riches stories. This has been referred to as
the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis [39].
Our toy model shows how both phenomena can be intri-
cately linked, with reduced economic mobility leading to
a more unequal society on the whole.
Strategies of combatting inequality on a microscopic
level, such as individual saving behaviour, prove ineffec-
tive in the segregated economy due to limited exposure of
poor agents to wealthy interaction partners. On the con-
trary, a global redistributive income or wealth tax tran-
7scends the spatial inhomogeneity and leads to a strong
decrease in inequality, quickly nullifying the effect of seg-
regation. Thermal fluctuations in the moving dynamics
also decrease inequality, with a sharp phase transition at
a critical temperature caused by a sudden desegregation
among the wealthy elite. The possibility of a sudden de-
crease of inequality, caused by a minor change in external
factors, suggests that small measures of economic policy
may suffice to reduce inequality, if only they manage to
carry the society across such a transition.
In our approach, kinetic exchanges were restricted to
nearest neighbours on a 2D lattice, inspired by the abun-
dant literature on residential segregation. A more re-
alistic model of economic interactions should take into
account that not all agents support an equal number
of links. Hence, the extension to more general net-
work structures is a natural next step. By displacing
links according to the proposed transition rule, wealth-
based segregation could be used to generate the struc-
ture of a socio-economic network. The rules obeyed in
kinetic exchanges have been kept minimal as well. In
the past, agent-based models have been developed in-
cluding stochastic growth, debt, firms, banks, tradeable
commodities, progressive taxation and other refinements
[22–24, 33]. Our findings suggest a simple way of incor-
porating social preferences and economic mobility into
agent-based studies of wealth and inequality.
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